



Washington D.C.  
September 1973

Prince Norodom Sihanouk has not been known for his reticence before representatives of the media. So great has been the volume of his statements, however, that the listener can easily lose his perspective.

In his own words, the Prince reveals both the Communist control of his former enemy, the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk's certainty that not even he could survive its system if it came to Cambodia.

The enclosed catalogue of Prince Sihanouk's statements has been prepared in order that the public can judge for itself the Prince's strange logic which would seem to ignore the evidence that he himself has presented concerning the true nature of the Communist side.

Press Office  
Embassy of the Khmer Republic



EMBASSY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC  
PRESS SECTION  
4500 - 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. - 20011

September 12, 1973

S T A T E M E N T S

B Y

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK *Varman*

1965 - 1973

- I. Statements on the Cambodian Communist Movement  
1965-1970
- II. Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders  
(Hu Nim, Hou Youn & Khieu Samphan)  
1968-1969
- III. Statements on Who Controls the Cambodian  
Insurgents  
1970-1973
- IV. Statements on His Future Role  
1965-1973
- V. Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance  
1970-1973
- VI. Statements on Effect of Bombing  
1973
- VII. Statements on Negotiations  
1972-1973
- VIII. Other Statements  
1973



I. STATEMENTS IN THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT  
1965 - 1970

June 1965:

"Last month I wrote... I have never had the slightest illusion about the fate that awaits me at the hands of the communists, as well as that which is reserved for 'my' government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the 'free world' and the US in particular... I concede again that after the disappearance of the US from our region and the victory of the communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene."

May 1967:

"As for such socialist countries as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we support them politically and diplomatically without reservation. But we cannot support certain among them in their efforts to neocolonialise Cambodia and turn it into a satellite by using Khmer Reds as their trojan horse."

September 1967:

"If the Khmer people find that Sihanouk and the Sangkum are good for nothing or are traitors or have done something bad, and if the Khmer people therefore want to expel Sihanouk and the Sangkum from the country, we will have nothing to say about it because it is the will of the Khmer people. But we cannot let the Khmer Reds say that Sihanouk and the Sangkum must be replaced by China. We cannot accept this because China has no right to come and rule over Cambodia."

March 1968:

"I will step down and turn the country over to General Lon Nol. Out of indignation with the Khmer Reds who do nothing but call others US lackeys, I am inclined to say that I want to side truly with the Americans. Out of indignation I want to submit really to the Americans because these people never stop speaking of my submission to the Americans. As to them, they who are lackeys of the Chinese and the Vietnamese, they have not said anything about that."

March 12, 1970:

"I am planning to ask the Russian and Chinese leaders to urge the Vietcong to leave us alone. I will always defend the neutrality of my country. I do not want it aligned to the West or the East. Neutrality is the condition for the survival of the Cambodian people... the rightists do not need to stage a coup d'etat against me. I am not really attached to power. If the people and the army wanted to go to the right, I would certainly let them go to the right."  
(In Paris, just before leaving for Moscow)



May 9, 1967:

"They launched these attacks because they want to create civil war...

"If we fail in our operations against them and if the Khmer (Cambodian) Viet Minh emerge victorious, they can transform the nation into a Communist country. If not they must continue to accept independence and neutrality...

"The masters of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong."

May 9, 1967:

"Concerning the Communists, dear companions, we say that we trust the Chinese and Vietnamese. But when the moment comes what will happen between us and the Vietnamese?"

"I must tell you that the Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong negotiated with us three or four times but that absolutely nothing comes out of the negotiations. They did not sign a pledge of respect for our present frontiers. That is the first problem. The second problem is the fact that the pro-Viet Minh Khmer (Cambodians) have had the habit of permitting the Viet Minh to come into our country. Formerly, after I had expelled the French and after the French troops left Cambodia, the Viet Minh remained in our country in order to conquer it. How can we have confidence in the Viet Minh? Will we be able to escape falling into their hands once we turn Communist?"

"...If we side with the Viet Minh, we will lose our independence..."

II. STATEMENTS ON CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS  
( HU NIM, HOU YOUN AND KHIEU SAMPHAN )  
1968 - 1969

February 1, 1968:

"Today there are about 10 persons being tried by the military court, and some of the Khmer Reds who found this out have taken flight into the forest, such as Hu Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, who have sold their country to foreigners -- the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong and the People's China. And now these guys who are plotting with the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong must leave the country at once for Vietnam."  
(Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh)

February 5, 1968:

"Then the Prince discussed the disappearance of Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan (Khmer Red leaders) who fled to a foreign country. He said: Their master had sent them here to stay."  
(Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh)



October 14, 1968:

"Sihanouk read a letter from a Khmer intellectual who had just returned to Cambodia from the United States, in which he praised the Sangkum's development. Sihanouk then commented on past events, recalling the time when Cambodia was infiltrated by the Viet-Minh, the masters of Hu Nim."

(Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh)

September 24, 1969:

"Sihanouk said he will again offer his sympathy and paternal and brotherly feelings to the Khmer Red leaders -- such as Hou Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim -- whenever the latter change their attitude and again become nationalist, royalist, Buddhist, or socialist Buddhist. He said that as long as they remain enemies of the nation, he is obliged to counterattack them."

(Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh)

October 13, 1969:

"Sihanouk then called on the families of Hu Nim and Hu Youn, Khmer Red leaders, to try to convince the two men to stop creating trouble and insecurity. Sihanouk said: It's just like they (Khmer Reds) have opened the door for the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh to enter and stay in the country. There are so many of them now. When I asked our Royal Armed Forces, how many Viet Cong and Viet Minh were in the country, I was told 40,000."

(Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh)

### III. STATEMENTS ON WHO CONTROLS THE CAMBODIAN INSURGENTS

1970 - 1973

April 28, 1972:

"He said that the strategy and tactics of the 'people's forces' were worked out in Cambodia itself by Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Cambodian Royal Government of popular union and his general staff, and nowhere else."

"As for eventual negotiations between himself and the United States, Prince Sihanouk toughened his position declaring that even for preliminary contacts before any negotiations the decision rested with the 'interior resistance' and not with himself."

(Sihanouk Interview - AFP)

April 28, 1973:

"If they (the U.S.) attempt to contact me, I shall consult Khieu Samphan and let him make a decision."

(Reuters from Peking)



April 13, 1973:

"...Inside Cambodia, he added, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim and Prince Norodom Phuressara are leading this government and running the country collectively." (Press Conference - Peking NCNA)

April 13, 1973:

"Sihanouk commented: Here are the three men (Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim and Hou Youn) who according to Lon Nol's propaganda have been shot by Sihanouk... It is they who are leading today's Cambodia and it is they inevitably who will lead the Cambodia of tomorrow." (Sihanouk Filming Conference - AFP Peking)

April 9, 1973:

"The RGNUC is not a government in exile, because the RGNUC means the leadership of Messrs, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim and, first of all, the people's power that has already been solidly installed in 90 percent of Kampuchea." (Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi - VNA)

April 10, 1973:

"That is why its government, even if it is composed of a majority of 'Red Khmers', is called and will always call itself a 'royal government! But as a regime, it is and will always be a pure people's democracy. It is the people and the people alone that exercises, and will exercise, all the powers, and not any 'sovereign', be he called Sihanouk."

(Sihanouk Speech - VNA)

1

January 31, 1973:

"Sihanouk stressed that the 'last word' on this matter (GRUNK reevaluation of war policy) belonged to Khieu Samphan." (Sihanouk Press Luncheon Speech - AFP)

January 31, 1973:

"Sihanouk cabled the New York Times: "If they (Interior Resistance leaders) refuse to let me return to Cambodia within 2 months at the latest, I will offer to them my resignation from my present position and will retire to France." (New York Times)

May 12, 1970:

"With regard to the managing of the country (education of the people, organization and defense of national territory, administration of the liberated townships, districts, provinces and cities, etc...), I have entrusted it entirely to the patriotic persons who are now



leading the national resistance in the country, particularly comrades Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. Thus, all of you who participate in the struggle are fighting for the motherland, for yourselves and for your families."

(Sihanouk Message to Armed Forces - Peking NCNA)

October 1970:

Sihanouk was quoted as saying to a European television correspondent that he was "frankly... out of touch" and lacked direct control of the situation in Cambodia.

September 26, 1970:

"Prince Norodom Sihanouk said today that the majority of the Royal Cambodian National Union Government is now Red Khmer, and the power already belongs to the Cambodian Communist Party.

"I am giving everything to the Red Khmers. They are pure. They will do what is necessary for the people. They are patriots. They will keep Cambodia independent."

(Interview with Sihanouk in Peking)

#### IV. STATEMENTS ON HIS FUTURE ROLE

December 10, 1971:

"But if I go on as chief of state after victory, I run the risk of being pushed out the window by the Communists, like Masaryk, or I might be imprisoned for revisionism or deviationism... It isn't that I lack physical or moral courage, but what I have to do is to rehabilitate myself and retire in beauty, in an exit that it is, if not triumphant, at least honorable. Obviously, it is possible that I might go on for a few years after liberation as chief of state. Even the Communists have asked me to. During the reconstruction period, Cambodia may still need me to represent the nation, to accept credentials from ambassadors, to do public relations. But I shall have nothing to do with domestic politics. That has cost me too much already.

"I am struggling for the liberation of my country. I have the strength to do that. But to fight to keep myself in power? No, I won't fight."

(Interview with Tribune de Geneva)

December 5, 1970:

"In an interview given in Peking to M. Alexandre Casella, an interview broadcast by the French Swiss radio station, Prince Norodom Sihanouk reaffirmed his intention of retiring from the political scene once General Lon Nol's Phnom Penh Government is overthrown. 'I shall hand over power to the young,' he said, 'and settle in France! Will Prince Sihanouk's departure mean the end of Cambodian monarchy?



'Undoubtedly,' the Prince replied, 'but, you see, we can do nothing about it. Assuming that Cambodia turns Red, it will be a Yugoslavia or a Romania at the most, but I believe that I will be rather pink than red.'"

(Paris Le Monde)

July 3, 1970:

"Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would resign as head of state after the liberation of Cambodia, and retire to Moujins, in southern France. He said: After the liberation, there will be problem of the Communists and non-Communists now assembled in the United National Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Will the front then hold together? I do not know, but I do not want to have to deal with the Communists after the liberation. That will be a problem for the young generation."

(Paris AFP)

April 21, 1970:

"I only wait for the day of complete victory of our people to tender them my resignation as the legal head of state and transfer them the legitimate power of the state given to me by the people in 1960. Moreover, I shall be able very soon to entrust all the responsibility of state affairs to the qualified representatives of our progressive people and youth who make up the new government of national union."

(Sihanouk's Third Message, Peking NCNA)

June 4, 1965:

"Last month I wrote in the monthly review Kambuja, published in Phnom Penh: 'I have never had the slightest illusion on the fate that awaits me at the hands of the Communists, as well as that which is reserved for my government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the 'free world,' and the U.S.A. in particular.'

"In an editorial which will appear shortly in this same review, I concede again that after the disappearance of the U.S.A. from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

"I know the Chinese well enough to understand that they cannot be 'bought' and that it is perfectly useless to bend before them, or to play their game occasionally in the hope of extracting some ulterior advantage. If I acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly so, by the Chinese people, who would not alter their plans one iota so far as my country is concerned."

(From a letter to the New York Times dated May 16, 1965)



August 12, 1973:

Russians. - "Of course the Russians knew everything! They had already chosen Lon Nol, in agreement with the Americans.....Even before the betrayal, I had had a discussion with Brezhnev. He kept insisting that I should participate in (a proposed) security pact for Southeast Asia, so finally I couldn't stand it any longer and blurted out: '...What are you proposing to me with this security pact? I'll tell you what--four gendarmes disguised as great powers. And who are these great powers? Are they France and England, which don't count at all...?' No, Mr. Brezhnev, the great powers are you two--American and the Soviet Union. The two of you are intent on dominating Asia and the world and, in order not to fight between you, have decided to divide it up."....The Russians set great store by the American presence in Asia. Without them, how would they succeed in keeping a check on China?"

North Vietnamese in Cambodia. - "I swear to you that, since the last half of 1972, there are no more North Vietnamese units in Cambodia."  
Khmer Rouge Attitude Toward Sihanouk. - "The Khmer Rouge do not love me at all. I know it! I understand very well they keep me with them, because without me they wouldn't have the peasants, and you can't make a revolution in Cambodia without the peasants. I understand very well that when I am no longer useful to them, they'll spit me out like a cherry pit. Mademoiselle..here in Peking there is a representative of the Khmer Rouge and he follows me around from morning to night. I know that his job is to spy on me. I know that he cordially detests me. You bet I know it. That man is my worst enemy.. What's more, I find him antipathetic. But what does that matter? Even if one day they wanted to assassinate me, what does it matter? Aren't they fighting against my enemies?... For me the main enemy is American imperialism and Lon Nol's fascism; the Communists are the secondary enemy. Conclusion: "I have decided to back the secondary enemy in order to defeat the main enemy. Do you understand?"  
(New York Times Magazine, Interview with Oriana Fallaci)

#### V. STATEMENTS ON DRV/PRC ASSISTANCE

April 28, 1973:

"He said the only North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the ranks of his forces were there on liaison missions. He said these North Vietnamese and Viet Cong dealt with such questions as getting supplies in the 'libertated' zones of Cambodia. He said his forces occasionally authorized the passage of Vietnamese units through Cambodian territory in the region near the border with South Vietnam but that these transit units did not take part in the fighting in Cambodia."  
(Sihanouk Interview - AFP)

April 10, 1973:

"This great victory is also yours, that is of all the glorious Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, in a very fraternal manner, has



taken upon herself the very heavy responsibilities of organizing and realizing my historic trip, a realization of the most heroic of all peoples, the Vietnamese people, though the travel was a very perilous one in view of the ill intentions of U.S. imperialism and the constant, incessant and impudent violations of the Paris agreements of January 27, 1973 by the Nixon government." . . .

"Your new, historic and decisive aid adds to the innumerable aids you have accorded to our people and our national resistance. It confirms in a most convincing manner in the eyes of the whole world that your support of the NUFC, the RGNVC, the CNPLAF and Norodom Sihanouk is total and indefectible....Nothing and nobody in the world can ever separate us from one another. We have always intimately shared weal and woe." . . .

"Respected and beloved Mr. Prime Minister of the DRV, you are one of the greatest heroes of our Indochina, one of the most noble supporters of Kampuchea and one of the most admired, most affectionate friends of the Khmer people and myself. Each of your words toward us and each of your gestures bear the highest significance." . . .

"With regard to weapons and munitions, I can affirm that on the one hand our great and indefectible friends -- the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--had helped us, prior to January 27, 1973, to build up a very important stock that enables us to carry on our armed struggle all by ourselves until 1975." (Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi, VNA Hanoi)

January 21, 1973:

"...We have just concluded a new military aid agreement with China and shipments are already on route." (Two agreements for military and economic aid were in fact signed in Peking on January 13, 1973) (Interview with AFP in Peking)

October 29, 1972:

"Our troops sometimes launch combined operations with our friends--the North Vietnamese and national liberation forces-- along the Cambodia-Vietnam borders. But our armed forces assume sole responsibility for all military operations within Cambodia. We grant to the troops of our North Vietnamese and national liberation forces friends the right of passage across our national territory, but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not have any permanent base within our country. The question of their evacuation from Cambodia is not posed and will not be." . . .

(Sihanouk cable to Indespress Correspondent-Answers his Questions - Broadcast by AKI)

October 4, 1972:

"Prince Sihanouk on October 4 told an AFP correspondent that he had recently received assurances from Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho that even if a separate cease-fire took place in Vietnam or Laos, Peking and Hanoi would continue to furnish arms and logistical support to the Cambodian combattants. Sihanouk said that Le Duc Tho



told me that...if you fear that we will achieve peace before you, please be assured that we will always continue to give you our support..."

(Sihanouk Interview - AFP)

September 4, 1972:

"Sihanouk told an AFP correspondent that 'the March offensive in Vietnam did away with dependence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the transport of material for South Vietnam and Cambodia...weapons and material now come directly from the North to the South through Quang Tri Province.'"

(A F P)

July 3, 1972:

"Sihanouk stated on July 3, 1972 that China and North Korea gave equipment and medical supplies but that the Vietnamese supplies the instructors and that 'our instructor-in-chief is General Giap...' 'It is true,' he said, 'that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia!'"

(AFP Interview)

December 10, 1971:

"China is giving us all kinds of aid, which enables us to exist as a state."

"Before, there were a great many Vietnamese units helping us, but now our units are overwhelmingly Cambodian, and we don't even have any more Vietnamese advisers or instructors."

(Sihanouk Interview with Tribune de Geneva)

October 19, 1971:

"He added that heavy artillery had been supplied to Cambodian 'reactionary forces,' while his own side had no heavy guns, only rockets and mortars. It is difficult for us to transport heavy artillery from China through North Vietnam and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, said the prince, who once spent two years as a student officer at the French tank and cavalry school."

(Phnom Penh Domestic Service)

September 26, 1970:

"Our regular troops are entirely equipped by China, including heavy equipment, and our militia are equipped by (North) Korea."

(AFP Sihanouk Interview)

July 3, 1970:

"Sihanouk said: It is true that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia. But why should anyone be astonished that the Indochinese unite? In Vietnam, the Americans erased the line of demarcation and they have turned the Vietnam war into an Indochinese war. Henceforth,



Indochina must be considered as a single battlefield, and the Indo-chinese will remain united until final victory."  
(Paris AFP in English)

May 27, 1970:

"We renew to the DRV, to its respected President, its respected leaders... the assurance of our... gratitude for their... backing, their total support and precious assistance to our government. Our people's struggle is inseparable from the struggle of the Vietnamese people...together we are fighting, together we shall win. Together our peoples will fight until all their countries are liberated... after our common victory we will always remain inseparable brothers... and... our three countries will cooperate closely in conformity with the resolutions of the Indochinese peoples summit conference."  
(Sihanouk Speech - VNA)

"Sihanouk also told Norman Webster of the Toronto Globe and Mail in July 1970 that he had been tempted to call in North Korean troops to help liberate Cambodia and that Kim Il Sung has urged him to accept 'volunteers' but that a 'majority of the members of his 'government' in exile felt that the job could be done by Cambodia resistance fighters from the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.' These statements of Sihanouk earned a rapid rebuttal from NCNA which on July 13 quoted a GRUNK statement 'refuting the distorted report... of Norman Webster.' The GRUNK statement nevertheless did not exclude all mention of the VC/NVA, but referred to 'Khmer forces and the United Front of the Indochinese peoples as being sufficient for the fighting.'

#### VI. STATEMENTS ON EFFECT OF BOMBING

April 13, 1973:

"I am surprised that in spite of the U.S. wanton bombings and the drought of last year, the liberated zone is very prosperous economically."

(Sihanouk Press Conference, Peking NCNA)

April 13, 1973:

"The towns in our hands are not being bombed but only the bridges and airports giving access to them are being bombed."

(Sihanouk Press Conference, Peking)

April 17, 1973:

"He added that the B-52 bombings are not causing many casualties in the liberated areas."

(Sihanouk Press Conference, AFP from Peking)



April 28, 1973:

"Asked about his own forces rocket attack on Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport earlier this week, in which a number of civilians living in makeshift homes were killed or injured, Prince Sihanouk said: 'That's war!'"

"The Prince cited two main reasons for the decision not to launch a final assault on Phnom Penh at this stage. One was the possible massive response to such an attack by the United States Air Force."

(Interview with Reuters in Peking)

## VII. STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS

April 28, 1973:

He added, "I can assure you solemnly that neither Peking nor Hanoi will ever lead us toward negotiations, they are wary of it and on our side. We have told them, and they well know, that we will not budge one inch."

"We will never negotiate with Lon Nol and his band. Their fate is the gallows."

(Sihanouk Interview - AFP)

April 28, 1973:

"I have four times expressed willingness to speak with either Nixon or Kissinger during their visits here. But it was rebuffed, he said."

"If they attempt to contact me, I will consult Khieu Samphan (the Khmer Rouge guerrilla leader in Cambodia) and let him make a decision."

"But such an approach would mean the Americans knew they were beaten and there would be no purpose in talking with them."  
(Reuters)

April 20, 1973:

"He said that there was no question of his resistance movement negotiating or reconciling itself with 'the traitors' in Phnom Penh."

"All we expect them to do is to resign," he said...

"Sihanouk said: 'I tell you solemnly that the leaders of the interior will never accept any compromise with the Phnom Penh clique. It is completely illusory for countries like the United States, France or the Soviet Union to count on a compromise solution.'"  
(Peking - AFP)



April 13, 1973:

"We have proposed reconciliation with the USA but maintain that the USA must put an end to this military involvement in Cambodia, end aid to Lon Nol and cease interference in our affairs...."

"We will never accept cease-fire or compromise."

"When we speak of negotiations with the USA, we mean to negotiate the question of ending U.S. interference, not the question of cease-fire. They are different questions. Cease-fire means splitting our country, means recognition of the Lon Nol-controlled zone."

(NCNA)

April 19, 1973:

"In this connection, I have just had a direct contact with the CNP-LAF and the RGNUC back home. They asked me to let the whole world know that they will never accept, in any case or any circumstance, any compromise whatsoever with the regime of the traitors, any cease-fire whatsoever, any 'peace conference' whatsoever. They are not bellicose, but they will only accept a peace with the installation of the RGNUC in Phnom Penh and with the rehabilitation of the independent and non-aligned Kingdom of Cambodia, that elimination of U.S. neo-colonialism from Khmer territory."

(Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi)

February 1, 1973:

"Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced in Hanoi yesterday that the policy of the United National Front of Kampuchea had been revised following the conclusion of the Vietnam cease-fire Agreement."

"The head of the RGNUC said that this new policy included an overture to the United States, a decrease of the military activities of the Cambodian resistance fighters, and provision for a general amnesty in Cambodia."

"He said: If the United States is willing to play the game of friendship with an independent and non-aligned Cambodia, we will be able to arrive at a quick reconciliation with the Washington Government. Prince Sihanouk added that he envisaged the resumption of a dialogue with the United States in two stages. He said: 'First, a meeting without any condition to see what each has up its sleeve, and the negotiations.' Prince Sihanouk added that the Cambodian problem could not be settled without the definitive retirement from political life of Lon Nol and his clique of traitors. He said: 'We do not want to capture them. They have sufficiently well-stocked bank accounts in Switzerland. They must leave.'"

February 1, 1973:

"...We must adapt to the changes. We are doing as the Vietnamese do. That is the reason for our 'new look' in our policy. But we will also maintain our principles.... Sihanouk emphasized that the purpose of the new policy was to avoid inconveniencing Cambodia's



neighbors who must observe the cease-fire. He said: This is why on the military level we are going deliberately to temporize, lowering the tone of air operations and not launching offensive actions."  
(Hanoi - AFP)

January 21, 1973:

"Sihanouk said that the American Government had not made any more offers to him since he rejected its offer for the establishment of a government of reconciliation in Phnom Penh of which he himself would have been head. The U.S. had suggested this solution to him last year through the Chinese Government. He had rejected the offer because for one thing it prescribed the winding up of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union and the Phnom Penh Government in favor of a Government of National Reconciliation that would have existed until general elections were held in Cambodia."  
(Interview with AFP Correspondent - Peking)

October 4, 1972:

"Sihanouk told an AFP Correspondent that Senator Mansfield's suggestions for a peace settlement in Cambodia was unacceptable to him (e.g. Sihanouk's return to Cambodia as the head of a Vietnam Government of National Union with the participation of Lon Nol's Government representatives)."  
(Interview with AFP Correspondent - Pelon)

September 4, 1972:

"Sihanouk said his forces were opposed to such an arrangement (e.g. cease-fire/partition) and would fight until the Lon Nol regime is completely eliminated. He said: We refuse the Nixon solution -- a cease-fire with international control. We do not accept either a cease-fire or partition or international control."  
(A F P)

July 25, 1972:

"They (and Britain and others) are proposing to us the formation of a government of national reconciliation or of national coalition. To sum up the matter, these governments would have three heads: one left, which would be we resisters; one right, which would be the pro-Americans; and one center, which would be the people who were not engaged in this war and whom I will call the cowards.

"Now a government with three components is necessarily a weak government, for there is no monolithic bloc. What will happen is clear: one will find on one side the patriots who form one-third of the government, and the other two-thirds will be formed by traitors and cowards. The result is that the minority third will be forced back into the bush, as is the case in Laos with the Pathet Lao."  
(Interview with Le Soleil)



VIII. OTHER STATEMENTS

June 29, 1973:

... Prince Sihanouk said he allowed the port of Sihanoukville - now known as Kompong Som - to be used by Chinese ships. He said they delivered military equipment, arms and ammunition to the Vietnamese Communist troops based on both sides of the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. . . . "We wanted to get rid of American aid, and as a result we not only had to open a casino but to handle transport, to become the Vietcong's coolies," the Prince said. "Two-thirds for the Vietcong, one-third for yourself - at that rate one sells oneself. So that was my end, that was my end. There is the truth. . . ." "I made them / the Cambodian Army / transport for the Vietcong. . . ." (Interview with Henry Kamm in Romania - The N.Y. Times, July 4, 1973)

June 30, 1973:

"Khieu Samphan says to me in the name of the whole resistance movement: Prince Sihanouk, you have already proposed to the Americans a peaceful solution. . . but don't lower yourself anymore. . ."

Prince Sihanouk said this meant that his offer to negotiate directly with the United States was withdrawn. But Mr. Ieng Sary whispered into the Prince's ear and the Prince said:

... "Ieng Sary says there is a nuance. The telegram is not the withdrawal but they ask me to say simply that I will propose nothing further. They reserve the right, if Mr. Nixon proposes it, to say yes or no." . . .

"The interior part is in charge of armed resistance and the administration of the liberated zone," he continued. "There I am a symbol. When I visited the liberated zone, the Khmer Rouge swore to me that our entente would last forever. I don't know what will happen after the total liberation of Cambodia. It is perhaps not a marriage of love but a marriage of reason. . ."

"They told me that I would be chief of state until the end of my life."

(Interview with Henry Kamm - The N.Y. Times, July 1, 1973)

July 13, 1973:

"There will be no contacts (with Dr. Kissinger for peaceful settlement of the conflict) and we will continue to fight, fight and fight until final victory even if this takes 10 years or more." (Reuters)



August 12, 1973:

". . . Oh, my goodness, I'm not that naive! The Khmer Rouge do not love me at all. I know it! . . ."

"I have no illusions about the Communists and up to a certain point I can even see that they are my enemies in precisely the same way as that unpleasant man who is always sticking to my heels. . ."  
(Interview with Oriana Fellaci - N.Y. Times Magazine)

September 6, 1973:

Exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk says he now plans to remain in permanent exile once Cambodia is "liberated". . . "They love me," he said of his old enemies, the Khmer Rouge. . . "But when they do not need me any more they will simply spit me out."

"My role in the country is ended once the whole of Cambodia is liberated," he explained.

"I shall let the Khmer Rouge run the country and I shall not interfere. Even if I wanted to oppose them and not let them be the only masters it is too late for they are too strong. . ."

Ieng Sary, a Khmer insurgent leader admitted that Prince Sihanouk was perfectly correct: "Sihanouk is one of those aspects of Cambodian tradition, like Buddhism and the monarchy, which we believe necessary for the larger union." Ieng Sary continued: "We will phase out those aspects we do not consider to be progressive and revolutionary as our nation and people evolve." . . . "They keep me now because they need me." Sihanouk added.

( Interview with Sylvana Foa, UPI)



On September 17, 1973, in an exclusive three-hour interview with T.D. Allman in Algiers, published in the London GUARDIAN on September 18, Prince Sihanouk declared "I have no more reason to be optimistic", and that "Lon Nol will be able to stay many years in Phnom Penh."

"We will not take Phnom Penh this year, nor next year, or for many years" and the Prince emphasized: "At the moment we cannot take any major town. I must be frank."

Prince Sihanouk described some of the Khmer Rouge members of his "United National Front of Cambodia" as being "far too Stalinist." Vis-à-vis the North Vietnamese, he said "Our North Vietnamese friends are no longer willing to help us..."

"The Khmer Rouge community in Peking is far too Stalinist", the Prince stated and that he found Ieng Sary "personally antipathetic... we cannot help it."

The Prince expressed deep pessimism about the war and the growing dissension within the insurgents' leadership.

"We now are totally isolated," he said.